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Abstract 
Differential Cryptanalysis is currently the most powerful tool avail-
able for analysing block ciphers, and new block ciphers need to be 
designed to resist it. It has been suggested that the use of S-boxes 
based on bent functions, with a fiat XOR profile, would be immune. 
However our studies of differential cryptanalysis, particularly applied 
to the LOKI cipher, have shown that this is not the case. In fact, this 
results in a relatively easily broken scheme. We show that an XOR 
profile with carefully placed zeroes is required. "Ve also' show that in 
order to avoid some variant forms of differential cryptanalysis, permu-
tation P needs to be chosen to prevent easy propagation of a constant 
XOR value back into the same S-box. We redesign the LOKI cipher 
to form LOKI91, to illustrate these results, as well as to correct the 
key schedule to remove the formation of equivalent keys. We conclude 
with an overview of the security of the new cipher. 
1 Introduction 
Cryptographic research is currently a very active field, with the need for 
new encryption algorithms having spurred the design of several new block 
ciphers [1]. The most powerful tool for analysing such block ciphers cur-
rently known is differential cryptanalysis. It has been used to find design 
deficiencies in many of the new ciphers. Some new design criteria have been 
37 
Output XOR n 
0 2-1 
0 a 0 0 0 
b c d e 
Input f g 
XOR h 
rn. 
2-1 i j 
Figure 1: An XOR Profile 
proposed which are claimed to provide immunity to differential cryptanal-
ysis. These involve the use of S-boxes based on bent functions, selected so 
the resultant box has a flat XOR profile. 
In this paper, after presenting a brief introduction to the k~y concepts 
in differential cryptanalysis, we will show that these new criteria do not 
provide the immunity claimed, but rather can result in the design of a 
scheme which may be relatively easily broken. What we believe is required, 
is an S-box with carefully placed zeroes, which significantly hinder the 
differential cryptanalysis process. 
vVe continue by documenting our analysis of the LOKI cipher. We 
report on a previously discovered differential cryptanalysis attack, faster 
than exhaustive search up to 11 rounds, as well as on a new attack, using 
an alternate form of analysis, which is faster than exhaustive search up 
to 14. rounds. vVe also briefly note some design deficiencies in the key 
schedule which resulted in the generation of equivalent keys. This process 
highlighted some necessary additional design criteria needed to strengthen 
block ciphers against these attacks. 
We conclude by describing the redesign of the LOKI cipher, using it to 
illustrate the application of these additional design principles, and make 
some comments on what we believe is the security of the new scheme. 
2 Differential Cryptanalysis 
2.1 Overview 
Differential Cryptanalysis is a dynamic attack against a cipher, using a very 
large number of chosen plaintext pairs, which through a statistical analysis 
of the resulting ciphertext pairs, can be used to determine the key in use. In 
general, differential cryptanalysis is much faster than exhaustive search for 
a certain number of rounds in the cipher, however there is a breakeven point 
where it becomes slower than exhaustive search. The lower the number of 
rounds this is, the greater the security of the cipher. Differential Crypt-
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Figure 2: A 2-round Iterative Characteristic 
analysis was first described by Biham and Shamir in [2], and in greater 
detail in [3]. These described the general technique, and its application to 
the analysis of the DES and the Generalised DES. Subsequent papers by 
them have detailed its application to FEAL and N-Hash [4], and to Snefru, 
Khafre, Redoc-II, LOKI, and Lucifer [5J. 
In Differential Cryptanalysis, a table showing the distribution of the 
XOR of input pairs against the XOR of output pairs is used to determine 
probabilities of a particular observed output pair being the result of some 
input pair. The general form of such a table is shown in Fig l. 
To attack a multi-round block cipher, the XOR profile is used to build 
n round characteristics, which have a given probability of occurring. These 
char~cteristics specify a particular input XOR, a possible output XOR, 
the necessary intermediate XOR's, and the probability of this occurring, 
In their original paper [3], Biham and Shamir describe 1,2,3 and 5 round 
characteristics which may be used to directly attack versions of DES up to 
7 rounds. Knowing a characteristic, it is possible to infer information about 
the outputs for the next two rounds. To utilise this attack, a number of pairs 
of inputs, having the nominated input XOR, are tried, until an output XOR 
results which indicates that the pattern specified in the characteristic has 
occurred. Since an n round characteristic has a probability of occurrence, 
Jor most keys we can state on average, how many pairs of inputs need to 
be trialed before the characteristic is successfully matched. Once a suitable 
pair, known as a right pair, has been found, information on possible keys 
which could have been used, is deduced. Once this is done we have two 
plaintext-ciphertext pairs. We know from the ciphertext, the input to the 
last round. Knowing the input XOR and output XOR for this round, we 
can thus restrict the possible key bits used in this round, by considering 
those outputs with an XOR of zero, providing information on the outputs 
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Figure 3: Flat XOR Profile 
of some of the S-boxes. By then locating additional right pairs we can 
eventually either uniquely determine the key, or deduce sufficient bits of it 
that an exhaustive search of the rest may be done. 
N round characteristics can be concatenated to form longer characteris-
tics if the output of the first supplies the input to the second, with probabil-
ities multiplied together. A particularly useful characteristic is one whose 
output is a swapped version of its input, and which hence may be iterated 
with itself. This may be used to analyse an arbitrary number of rounds 
of the cipher, with a steadily increasing work factor. A particularly useful 
for~ is one where a non-zero input XOR to the F function results in a 
zero output XOR. Such a characteristic is illustrated in Fig 2, and may be 
denoted as: 
A. (x, 0) -> (0, x) always (ie Pr=l) 
B. (0, x) -> (x, 0) with some probability p 
It may be iterated as A B A B A B A B to 8 rounds for example, with 
characteristic probability p4. This form of characteristic is then used in 
the analysis of arbitrary n round forms of a cipher, until the work factor 
exceeds exhaustive search. These techniques are described in detail in [3]. 
2.2 Why Flat XOR profiles Don't Work 
Given the success of differential cryptanalysis in the analysis of block ci-
phers, it has become important to develop design criteria to improve the 
resistance of block ciphers to it, especially with several candidates having 
performed poorly. Dawson and Tavares [6] have proposed that theselec-
tion of S-boxes with equal probabilities for each output XOR given an input 
XOR (except input 0) would result in a cipher that was immune to differ-
ential cryptanalysis (see Fig. 3). However a careful study of Biham and 
Shamir's attack on the 8 round version of DES [3], confirmed by our own 
analyses of LOKI, have shown that this is not the case. 
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Indeed the selection of such S-boxes results in a cipher which is signifi-
cantly easier to crypt analyse than normal. This is done by constructing a 
2 round iterative characteristic of the form in Fig. 2, with an input XOR 
that changes bits to one S-box only. 'YVe know we can do this, since the 
fiat XOR profile implies that an output XOR of 0 for a specified input 
XOR will occur with Pr(1/2n). When iterated over 2k rounds, this will 
have a probability of Pr(1/2(k-l)n), since you get the last round for free. 
Consider a 16 round DES style cryptosystem, but with S-boxes having a 
fiat XOR profile of the form in Fig. 3 with m = 6, n = 4, and k = 8. This 
may be attacked by a 15-round characteristic, chosen to alter inputs to a 
single S-box only. This gives a probability to break with a given test pair 
of Pr(1/228 ), implying that about 228 pairs need to be tried to break the 
cipher, far easier than by exhaustive search. 
2.3 Significance of Permutation P 
Although differential cryptanalysis may be done independent of permuta-
tion P, knowledge of a particular P may be used to construct some other 
useful n round characteristics for crypt analysing a particular cipher. The 
most useful of these take the form of a 2 or 3 round characteristic which 
generate an output XOR identical to the input XOR, either directly in 2 
rounds, or by oscillating between two alternate XOR values over 3 round-
s. The 1 round characteristic is sensitive to the form of permutation P. 
This form of characteristic has been found in the original version of LOKI, 
as detailed below. It thus indicates that care is needed in the design of 
not just the S-boxes, but of all elements in function F, in order to reduce 
susceptibility to differential cryptanalysis. 
3 Analysis of LOKI 
3.1 Overview 
LOKI is one of several recently proposed new block ciphers. It was original-
ly detailed by Brown, Pieprzyk and Seberry in [7]. Its overall structure is 
shown in Fig. 4. We will refer to this version of the cipher as L01(I89 in the 
remainder of this paper. It is a 16 round Feistel style cipher, with a relative-
ly straightforward key schedule, a non-linear function F = P(S(E(RtBK))), 
and four identical 12-to-8 bit S-boxes. Permutation P in LOKI has a regu-
lar structure which distributes the 8 output bits from each S-box to boxes 
[+3 + 2 + 1 0 + 3 + 2 + 1 0] in the next round. Its S-box consists of 16 
1-1 functions, based on exponentiation in a Galois field GF(28 ) (see [8]), 
with the general structure shown in Fig. 4. 
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Figure 4: LOKI89 Overall Structure and S-box Detail 
3.2 Security of LOKI89 
Initial testing of the statistical and complexity properties of LOKI89 in-
dicated that its properties were very similar to those exhibited by DES, 
FEAL8 and Lucifer [9], results that were very encouraging. Initial exami-
nation of the XOR profile of the LOKI89 S-box also suggested that it should 
be more resistant than DES to differential cryptanalysis. 
LOKI89 was then analysed in detail using differential cryptanalysis. 
Biham [5] describes an attack, using a 2 round iterative characteristic with 
Pr(118/220 ) ~ Pr(2-13.12 ), with non-zero inputs to 2 S-boxes resulting in 
the same output. There are four related variants (by rotation) of the form: 
A. (00000510,00000000) -) (00000000,00000510) 
B. (00000000,00000510) -) (00000510,00000000) 
alvays 
Pr(118/2-20) 
This characteristic is iterated to 8 rounds with Pr(2-52 .48 ), allowing up to 
10 rounds to be broken faster than by exhaustive key space search. This 
is a significantly better result than for the DES. The authors have verified 
this attack. 
The authors have subsequently found an alternate 3 round iterative 
characteristic, attacking S-box 3, with an output XOR identical to the 
input XOR. Since permutation P in LOKIS9 permutes some output bits 
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back to the same S-box in the next round, this allows the characteristic to 
be iterated. It has the form: 
A. (00400000,00000000) -> (00000000,00400000) 
B. (00000000,00400000) -> (00400000,00400000) 
C. (00400000,00400000) -> (00400000,00000000) 
always 
Pr(28/4096) 
Pr(28/4096) 
Since 28/4096 ::::: 2-7•2 if we concatenate these characteristics, we get a 13 
round characteristic in the order ABC ABC ABC ABC A with 
a probability of Pr(2-7•2*8) ::::: Pr(2-S7•6 ). This may be used to attack a 
14 round version of LOKI89, and requires 0(259 ) pairs to succeed. This 
is of the same order as exhaustive search (which is of 0(260), as detailed 
below), and is thus a more successful attac1..'-than that reported previously. 
It has been verified by Biham. This still leaves the full 16 round version of 
LOKI89 secure, but with a reduced margin against that originally believed. 
Independently, the authors [10], Biham [5], and the members of the 
RIPE consortium have discovered a weakness in the LOKI89 key schedule. 
It results in the generation of 15 equivalent keys for any given key, effectively 
reducing the key-space to 260 keys. A complementation property also exists 
which results in 256 (key, plain, cipher) triples being formed, related by 
LOK I(P, K) 6 pppppppppppppppp = LOI(J(P 6 pppppppppppppppp, K e 
mmmmmmmmnnnnnnnn), where p = m6n for arbitrary hex values m, n. 
This may be used to reduce the complexity of a chosen plaintext attack by 
an additional factor of 16. These results were found by analysing the key 
schedule by regarding each S-box input as a linear function of the key and 
plaintext, and solving to form (key, plaintext) pairs which result in identical 
S-box input values. This lead to solving the following equations: 
RD 6 KRD 6 n.ROTI2(KLD) = 0 
LD 6 KLD 6 n.ROTI2(J(RD) = 0 
(1) 
(2) 
where LD = L' 6 L, RD = R' 6 R, J(LD = J(L' 6 KL, and J(RD = 
K R' 9 J( R describe the difference between the related (key, plaintext) pairs. 
This method is detailed by Kwan in [10]. 
In the light of these results, the authors have devised some additional 
design guidelines to those originally used in the design of LOKI, and have 
applied them in the development of a new version, LOKI91. 
4 Redesign of LOKI 
4.1 Some Additional Design Guidelines 
To improve the resistance of a cipher to differential cryptanalysis, and to 
remove problems with the key schedule, the following guidelines were used: 
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• analyse the key schedule to minimize the generation of equivalent key, 
or related (key, plaintext) pairs. 
• minimise the probability that a non-zero input XOR results in a zero 
output XOR, or in an identical output XOR, particularly for inputs 
that differ in only 1 or 2 S-boxes. 
• ensure the cipher has sufficient rounds so that exhaustive search is 
the optimal attack (ie have insufficient pairs to do differential crypt-
analysis). 
• ensure that there is no way to make all S-~()xes give 0 outputs, to 
increase the ciphers security when used in hashing modes. 
These criteria were used when selecting the changes made to the LOKI 
structure, detailed below. 
4.2 Design of LOKI91 
LOKI91 is the revised version, developed to address the results detailed 
above. Changes have been made to two aspects of the LOKI structure. 
Firstly the key schedule has been amended in several places to significantly 
reduce the number of weak keys. Secondly the function used in the S-
boxes has been altered to improve its utility in hashing applications, and 
to improve its immunity to differential cryptanalysis. In more detail, the 
four changes made to the original design were: 
1. change key schedule to swap halves after every second round 
2. change key rotations to alternate between ROTI3 and ROT12 
3. remove initial and final XORs of key with plaintext and ciphertext 
4. alter the S-box function used in the LOKI S-box (Fig. 4) to 
Sfn(row, col) = (col + ((row * 17) $ f!Is)&fflS?lmodg roUJ (3) 
where + and * refer to arithmetic addition and multiplication, EB is 
addition modulo 2, and the exponentiation is performed in GF(28 ). 
The generator polynomials used (grow) are as for LOKI89 [7J. 
The overall structure of LOKI9I that results from these changes is 
shown in Fig. 5. 
The key schedule changes remove all but a single bit complementa-
tion property, leaving an effective search space of 263 keys under a chosen-
plaintext attack. It reduces key equivalences to a single bit complementa-
tion property, similar to that of the DES where LO J( I( P, K) = LO K I( P, K), 
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by reducing the solutions to each of Eq. 1 and Eq. 2 to one, and remov-
ing the independence between them by altering the swapping to every two 
rounds. It also greatly reduces the number of weak and semi-weak keys to 
those shown in Table 1 (where an * denotes weak keys). The DES also has 
16 weak and semi-weak keys. 
The removal of the initial and final XORs became necessary with the 
change in the swap locations, since otherwise it would have resulted _ in 
cancellation of the keys bits at the input to E in some rounds. This change 
does affect the growth of ciphertext dependence on keys bits (see [ll]), 
increasing it from 3 to 5 rounds. This still compares favorably with the 
DES which takes either 5 or 7 rounds, dependent on the type of dependency 
analysed. This change also greatly assisted in the reduction of the number 
of equivalent keys. 
The new Sfn uses arithmetic addition and multiplication, as these are 
non-linear when used in GF(28 ). The addition modulo two of the row with 
1116 ensures that an all zero input gives a non-zero output, thus removing 
the major deficiency of L01<189 when used as a hash function. The result of 
the addition and multiplication is masked with f /16 to restrict the value to 
lie with GF(28 ), prior to the exponentiation in that field. The new function 
reduces the probabilities of occurance of n round iterative characteristics, 
45 
Encrypt Key Decrypt Key 
0000000000000000 0000000000000000 * 
OOOOOOOOaaaaaaaa aaaaaaaaOOOOOOOO 
0000000055555555 5555555500000000 
OOOOOOOOffffffff ffffffffOOOOOOOO 
aaaaaaaaOOOOOOOO OOOOOOOOaaaaaaaa 
aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa * 
aaaaaaaa55555555 55555555aaaaaaaa 
aaaaaaaaffffffff fffffffffaaaaaaaa 
5555555500000000 0000000055555555 
55555555aaaaaaaa aaaaaaaa55555555 
5555555555555555 5555555555555555 * 
55555555ffffffff ffffffff55555555 
ffffffffOOOOOOOO OOOOOOOOffffffff 
ffffffffaaaaaaaa aaaaaaaaffffffff 
ffffffff55555555 55555555ffffffff 
ffffffffffffffff ffffffffffffffff * 
Table 1: LOKI91 Weak and semi-weak key pairs 
useful for differential cryptanalysis, to be as low as possible. With the new 
function, LOKI91 is theoretically breakable faster than an exhaustive key 
space search in: 
• up to 10 rounds using a 2 round characteristic with the f(x')- > 0' 
mapping occuring with Pr(122/1048576) 
• up to 12 rounds using a 3 round characteristic with the f(x')- > x' 
mapping occuring with Pr(16/4096) (used twice) 
At 16 rounds, cryptanalysis is generally impossible, as insufficient pairs 
are available to complete the analysis. It would require: 
• 280 pairs using the 3 round characterisitic, or 
• 292 pairs using the 2 round characteristic 
compared to a total of 263 possible plaintext pairs. 
5 Conclusion 
In this paper, we have shown that a flat XOR profile does not provide 
immunity to differential cryptanalysis, but in fact leads to a very insecure 
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scheme. Instead a carefully chosen XOR profile, with suitably placed 0 
entries is required to satisfy the new design guidelines we have identified. 
We also note an analysis of key schedules, which can be used to determine 
the number of equivalent keys. \Ve conclude with the application of these 
results to the design of LOKI91. 
6 Acknowledgements 
Thank you to the members of the crypt group for their support and sugges-
tions. This work has been supported by ARC grant A48830241, ATERB, 
and Telecom Australia research contract 7027. 
Appendix A - Specification of LOKI91 
Encryption 
The overall structure of LOKI91 is shown in Fig. 5, and is specified as 
follows. The 64-bit input block X is partitioned into two 32-bit blocks L 
and R. Similarly, the 64-bit key is partitioned into twu 32-bit blocks J( L 
and J(R. 
Lo = L J( Lo = J( L 
Ro = R KRo = KR 
(4) 
The key-dependent computation consists (except for a final interchange 
of blocks) of 16 rounds (iterations) of a set of operations. Each iteration in-
cludes the calculation of the encryption function f. This is a concatenation 
of a modulo 2 addition and three functions E, S, and P. Function f takes 
as input the 32-bit right data half R;-l and the 32-bit left key half K Li 
produced by the key schedule KS (denoted J(i below), and which produces 
a 32-bit result which is added modulo 2 to the left data half Li-l. The 
two data halves are then interchanged (except after the last round). Each 
round may thus be characterised as: 
Li = R-l 
R = Li-l EB f(R;-l, J( Li) (5) 
f(R;-l. J(i) = P(S(E(R-l EB K i») 
The component functions E, S, and P are described later. 
The key schedule KS is responsible for deriving the sub-keys Ki, and is 
defined as follows: the 64-bit key J( is partitioned into two 32-bit halves 
K L and K R. In each round i, the sub-key Ki is the current left half of 
the key K [,i-;. On odd numbered rounds (1, 3, 5, etc), this half is then 
rotated 12 bits to the left. On even numbered rounds (2, 4, 6, etc), this 
half is then rotated 13 bits to the left, and the key halves are interchanged. 
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3 2 1 0 31 30 29 28 27 26 
27 26 25 24 23 22 21 20 19 18 
19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 
11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 
Table 2: LOKI Expansion Function E 
I 
This may be defined for odd numbered rounds as: 
K. = KLi- l 
K Li = ROL(K Li- l , 13) 
K Ri = K R;-l 
This may be defined for even numbered rounds as: 
Ki = K L i - l 
KLi = KR;-l 
KR; = ROL(KLi_l,12) 
25 24 
17 16 
9 8 
1 0 
(6) 
(7) 
Finally after the 16 rounds, the two output block halves Ll6 and R16 
are then concatenated together to form the output block Y. This is defined 
as (note the swap of data halves to undo the final interchange in Eq.5): 
(8) 
Decryption 
The decryption computation is identical to that used for encryption, save 
that the partial keys used as input to the function ! in each round are 
calculated in reverse order. The rotations are to the right, and an initial 
pre-rotation of 8 places is needed to form the key pattern. 
Function f 
The encryption function! is a concatenation of a modulo 2 addition and 
three functions E, 5, and P, which takes as input the 32-bit right data half 
R;-l and the 32-bit left key half KL i , and produces a 32-bit result which 
is added modulo 2 to the left data half L i- l . 
!(R;-l, K i ) = P(5(E(R;-l @ K i ))) (9) 
The modulo 2 addition of the key and data halves ensures that the 
output of ! will be a complex function of both of these values. 
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Row genroUJ eroUJ 
0 375 31 
1 379 31 
2 391 31 
3 395 31 
4 397 31 
5 415 31 I 
6 419 31 
7 425 31 
8 433 31 
9 445 31 
10 451 31 
11 463 31 
12 471 31 
13 477 31 
14 487 31 
15 499 31 
Table 3: LOKI S-box Irreducible Polynomials and Exponents 
The expansion function E takes a 32-bit input and produces a 48-bit 
output block, composed offour 12-bit blocks which form the inputs to four 
S-boxes in function j. Function E selects consecutive blocks of twelve bits 
as inputs to S-boxes S(4), S(3), S(2), and S(I) respectively, as follows: 
[b3 b2 ••• bo b3I b30 ••• b24 ] 
[b21 b26 ••• b16] 
[b19 bIS ••• bs] 
[b l1 bIO ••• bol 
This is shown in full in Table 2 which specifies the source bit for outputs 
bits 47 to 0 respectively: 
The substitution function S provides the confusion component in the 
LOKI cipher. It takes a 48-bit input and produces a 32-bit output. It is 
composed of four S-boxes, each of which takes a 12-bit input and produces 
an 8-bit output, which are concatenated together to form the 32-bit output 
of S. The 8-bit output from S(4) becomes the most significant byte (bits 
[31...24]), then the outputs from S(3) (bits[23 ... 16]), S(2) (bits[15 ... 8]), and 
S(I) (bits [7 ... 0]). In LOKI91 the four S-boxes are identical. The form 
of each S-box is shown in Fig 4. The 12-bit input is partitioned into two 
segments: a 4-bit row value row formed from bits [b l1 bIO bI bo], and an 8-bit 
column value eol formed from bits [b9 bs ... b3 b2]. The row value row is used 
to select one of 16 S-functions SjnroUJ(eol), which then take as input the 
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31 23 15 7 30 22 14 6 
29 21 13 5 28 20 12 4 
27 19 11 3 26 1~ 10 2 
25 17 9 1 24 16 8 0 
Table 4: LOKI Permutation P 
column value col and produce an 8-bit output value. This is defined as: 
SfnroUl(col) = (col + «row * 17) E!1 ffls)r&fflsyr""'modg roUl (10) 
where genroUl is an irreducible polynomial in G F(28 ), and eroUl is the (con-
stant 31) exponent used in forming Sf nroUl ( col). The generators and expo-
nents to be used in the 16 S-functions in LOKI91 are specified in Table 3. 
For ease of implementation in hardware, this function can also be written 
as: 
SfnroUl(col) = (col + «row)l(row « 4))&f hs)31modgroUl (11) 
The permutation function P provides diffusion of the outputs from the 
four S-boxes across the inputs of all S-boxes in the next round. It takes the 
32-bit concatenated outputs from the S-boxes, and distributes them over 
all the inputs for the next round via a regular wire crossing which takes 
bits from the outputs of each S-box in turn, as defined in Table 4 which 
specifies the source bit for output bits 31 to 0 respectively. 
Test Data 
A single test triplet for the LOKI91 primitive is listed below. 
# Single LOKI91 Certification triplet 
# data is saved as (key, plaintext, ciphertext) hex tripiets 
# 
3849674c260231ge 126898d55e911500 c86caecle3b7b17e 
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